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Abstract Given the personal acquaintance between Alan M. Turing
and W. Ross Ashby and the partial proximity of their research fields, a
comparative view of Turing’s and Ashby’s works on modelling “the action
of the brain” (in a 1946 letter from Turing to Ashby) will help to shed
light on the seemingly strict symbolic / embodied dichotomy: while it is a
straightforward matter to demonstrate Turing’s and Ashby’s respective
commitments to formal, computational and material, analogue methods
of modelling, there is no unambiguous mapping of these approaches onto
symbol-based AI and embodiment-centered views respectively. Instead, it
will be argued that both approaches, starting from a formal core, were at
least partly concerned with biological and embodied phenomena, albeit
in revealingly distinct ways.
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1 Introduction
Not very much has been written to date on the relation between Alan M. Turing
and W. Ross Ashby, both of whom were members of the “Ratio Club” (1949–
1958).1 Not much of the communication between the two seems to have been
preserved or discovered either, the major exception being a letter from Turing
to Ashby that includes the following statement:
In working on the ACE [an early digital computer] I am more interested
in the possibility of producing models of the action of the brain than in
the practical applications of computing. [. . . ]
It would be quite possible for the machine to try out variations of be-
haviour and accept or reject them in the manner you describe and I
have been hoping to make the machine do this. This is possible because,
without altering the design of the machine itself, it can, in theory at any
rate, be used as a model of any other machine, by making it remember
a suitable set of instructions. (Turing, 1946, 1 f)
1 The best historical accounts of the Ratio Club and Turing’s and Ashby’s roles therein
are Husbands and Holland (2008), Holland and Husbands (2011).
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A comparative view of Turing’s and Ashby’s work on modelling “the action of
the brain” (Turing, 1946) will help to elucidate the modelling properties of ma-
chines with respect to human thinking and behaviour. It will be safe to say that
Turing was committed to formal “symbolic simulations” and Ashby to material
“working models”, with corresponding modes of reference to their target systems.
This part of the analysis will be largely in line with Peter Asaro’s account of
“Computers as Models of the Mind” (2011). However, in terms of Turing’s and
Ashby’s fundamental views of the nature of what is modelled, the picture gets
more complex: despite the respective foci of their models on the functions of ma-
chines and biological systems, both approaches were in some important respects
concerned with biological and embodied phenomena. Both relied on theories of
these phenomena, but they relied on competing theories in distinct ways. I will
go through Turing and Ashby twice in order to make these points clear, first
outlining their takes on modelling (Section 2), then their biological credentials
(Section 3) and finally their implications (Section 4).
2 Formal and Material Models
There are various key motives shared between Turing’s and Ashby’s work that
would figure in either AI or cybernetics. Both Turing and Ashby believed that
“the action of the human brain” can be subject to a method of modelling that
casts it in a strict mathematical description and breaks it down into elementary
routines in such a way that the model could be implemented in some kind of
machine, in principle at least.
The shared motive of devising machine-implementable models rests on the
premise that the behaviour of some system can be described or imitated by a
system of altogether different physical make-up. The notion that an identical
set of logical operations can be realised in physically variant systems has its
paradigm in Turing’s universal computing machines, which were initially the-
oretical machines (1936). This proposition has come to be known as “machine
state” or “Turing Machine” functionalism (this terminology being introduced by
Putnam, 1975).
However, first, while Ashby certainly embraced multiple realisability for his
machine models, the functionalism he employed and the analogies it implied
ultimately were different in kind from Turing’s machine state functionalism.
Instead, Ashby’s functionalism was a biological, essentially Darwinian one, as
shall be demonstrated in Section 3. Second, there is a number of ways in which
Turing and Ashby differed with respect to the manner in which machines shall
serve as models, and what the paradigm of machines to do that modelling is.
These differences will be briefly outlined in the present section.
Turing: Turing based his models on his mathematical theory of computation.
His original quest was for solving the “Entscheidungsproblem” (decision problem)
in Gödel (1931): Turing’s idea was that the operations required for evaluating
whether a given logical proposition can be proven true or false within the calcu-
lus to which that proposition belongs could be implemented in an appropriate
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kind of theoretical machinery, christened the “Logical Computing Machine”, by
means of interchangeable sets of formal instructions, that is, programs (Turing,
1936). This method could be applied to any field of inquiry that allows for a
translation of complex logical propositions into a set of elementary, machine-
executable operations. The physical characteristics of any real-world machine to
implement these functions are underspecified by this requirement, as long as the
requisite formal characteristics are in place. As a matter of historical fact, how-
ever, the machines to accomplish this task turned out to be digital, electronic,
programmable computers. While Turing’s own work made major conceptual and
practical contributions to the development of these machines, and while com-
puters are the paradigmatic logical computing machines, this does not imply
that digital computers are the only conceivable machines of this sort.
The theoretical import of Turing’s models lies fully within the realm of math-
ematics, while their empirical import lies in demonstrating the scope and force
of his theory of computability in (thought-) experimental fashion in a variety
of fields. His self-ascribed primary empirical interest was in the action of the
brain, but his most substantial contribution to any field outside computer sci-
ence was his mathematical theory of morphogenesis, that is, the patterns of or-
ganic growth (Turing, 1952),2 to which I will pay detailed attention in Section 3.
With respect to cognitive phenomena, Turing placed his inquiry on two separ-
ate levels: in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, he engaged in “drawing a
fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man”
(1950, p. 434) in the design of his “imitation game”. In order to grant fair play
to machines in this game of simulating human conversational behaviour, he sug-
gested to disconnect conversational abilities from any underlying organic traits.
However, when Turing moved on to a consideration of possible mechanisms re-
sponsible for these conversational abilities, he introduced his proto-connectionist
“B-type unorganised machines” that exemplify structures and processes in the
brain on an abstract level (Turing 1948; see also Copeland and Proudfoot 1996).
Either way, Turing considered the phenomena in question chiefly in their
form, and thereby to the extent they are accessible to the computational method.
More precisely, his quest was for descriptions of the behaviour of a target system
that can either directly serve as, or be transformed into, input variables for a set
of equations which can then be solved by applying computational routines, so
that the output either directly describes or predicts a further behaviour of that
target system, or can be transformed into such a description or prediction. Any
2 In the introduction to a posthumous collection of Turing’s writings on morpho-
genesis, Peter T. Saunders claims that Turing (1952) “is still very frequently cited
(more than the rest of Turing’s works taken together [. . . ])” (Saunders, 1992,
p. xvi). If Google Scholar and citation counts are resources to go by, the paren-
thetical part of this statement is an exaggeration, but Turing (1952) still ranks
approximately 10 and 20 percent higher in number of citations respectively than
the other two of his most-referenced works, Turing (1950) and Turing (1936): ht-
tps://scholar.google.de/citations?user=VWCHlwkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao (accessed
March 28th, 2018). The Thomson Reuters and Scopus databases have an incomplete
record of the original editions, hence cannot be used for comparison.
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system whose behaviour can be formalised so as to be amenable to this kind of
procedure could be subject to the computational method.
Moreover, Turing engaged in formally “describing the mode of behaviour”
(Turing, 1946, p. 2) of a learning system on an individual level in the first place,
treating it as a self-contained entity connected to an environment through a
number of in- and output channels. The environment of that entity remains un-
derspecified, and is mostly conceived of as input from the experimenter. When
Turing considered the action of the brain, he purposefully limited his focus on
that organ proper (for this observation, see Hodges, 2008, p. 85). Such focus on
self-contained, individual entities was arguably guided by a methodological pre-
supposition: as the original topic of Turing’s inquiry were elementary recursive
operations within a calculus, any empirical test for the force and scope of the
computational method would, if not necessarily then naturally, commence with
relations of this kind in the target system.3 The notion of arithmetical routines
repeatedly using their own output as input for their next round of application
(hence “calling on themselves”) may count as the paradigm of Turing’s compu-
tational method. The method’s focus is on what happens to an initial, expressly
restricted, input over the course of repeated computational steps, unlike, for
example, the equations describing the time evolution of a dynamical system,
which take an open-ended sequence of states of the environment as their input
values. This basic methodological presupposition, rather than the higher-order
question of embodiment, might be the first indicator of the schism that would
later develop between cognitivist AI and cybernetics.
Ashby: Ashby’s models and their target systems differ from Turing’s, first, in his
quest being for the origins of adaptive behaviour of organisms and other systems
with respect to their environments (Ashby, 1947, 1960). He built his homeostat
as a system that was supposed to actually learn, and to share a set of core
features of functional organisation with any other, natural or artificial, learning
system that has to cope with changing environmental variables. The overarching
systematic goal of his research was to explain “whence come the patterning
properties of the nervous system” (Ashby, 1928-1972, p. 6117, entry of June 13th,
1959). In shaping those patterning properties, interactions with the environment,
including the behaviour of other organisms, played a crucial role, and were thus
fully and expressly incorporated in Ashby’s machine model. Hence, second, the
best available evidence of the validity of the model lies in its ability to function
in real, variable environments, and is best exemplified by a physical machine,
the homeostat. There was both a didactic and a systematic purpose in having
a physical implementation of the model. Third, Ashby’s methodological choice
was to describe the time evolution of a system, as defined by the observer. That
description consisted in tracking a succession of states as “lines of behaviour”
in a phase space or “field” of the values of the selected variables, given certain
3 For anti-individualistic views of Turing’s approach, see the reading of Turing (1948)
proposed by Herold (2003) and the claim that Turing machines are situated systems
by virtue of their tapes being part of their local environments (Fabry, 2018).
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initial states and a sequence of environmental inputs. This approach has fairly
little in common with the recursive operations applied to delimited and largely
self-contained systems that was favoured by Turing.
These marks of distinction from Turing’s approach find their common roots
in the Darwinian paradigm to which Ashby committed himself, and hence in a
theory of the evolution of biological systems. Ashby assumed this framework to
generalise to all sorts of systems capable of adaptive behaviours or, in Ashby’s
terminology, attaining equilibrial states. His assumption was that adaptivity
and goal-directed organisation emerge from processes that are not goal-directed
themselves but include random variation and deterministic selection, and he
tried to single out the basic natural mechanisms by which they are accomplished.
Ashby’s machines modelled organism-environment relations as relations of negat-
ive feedback, in which changes in environmental variables provoke counter-effects
in the machine, and vice versa. If the change in environmental variables pushes
some of the variables within the machine beyond a threshold of stability, the
machine, by means of “step-mechanisms”, randomly produces new states (as the
counterpart of variation in Darwinian evolution) and matches them against what
the environment provides (as the analogue of natural selection) until it re-enters
a domain of stable values (resulting in an analogue of fitness).
Ashby’s approach to modelling was formal and mathematical inasmuch as the
theory of feedback mechanisms, equilibria, and stability can be articulated in rig-
orous mathematical fashion. However, Ashby employed a formal, mathematical
apparatus primarily in instrumental fashion, making it subserve the broader pur-
pose of a general science of organisms and other systems. Hence, the theoretical
import of Ashby’s modelling did not lie within the realm of mathematics. Nor
were his models computational under any interpretation that would approxim-
ate Turing’s notion. Moreover, Ashby’s approach to modelling was also genuinely
material, not merely in terms of the model’s physical implementation. There are
isomorphisms supposed to hold between the functional status of a machine and
the functional status of a target system in such a way that transformations in
the target system are matched by transformations in the machine model that
are analogous in terms of the functional states involved. If there are an irritation
and a negative feedback in a target system upon a certain input, there should be
an irritation and a negative feedback in the machine model as well, with meas-
urable correspondences. Arguably, the materiality and non-computationality of
Ashby’s models in conjunction made them less universal and less adaptable than
Turing’s computer models, at least once they were computer-implementable in
fact (which, as Asaro 2011 observes, makes the choice of modelling approaches
a matter of available resources in part).
On the background of this discussion, the differences between Turing’s and
Ashby’s approaches can be located on two general levels: First, the primary
though not the exclusive focus was on formal versus material modelling re-
spectively, with diverging roles assigned to the mathematical methods involved.
Second, the functionalism implied by Ashby’s argument was of a different sort
than Turing’s: it primarily considered adaptive, biological or biologically based,
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functions of brains and other systems to be modelled rather than the logical prop-
erties of machine states. Ashby expressly focused on, while Turing intentionally
skipped over, the question of where and how the goal-directed organisation of
organism or machine in their concrete environments originate.
3 Adaptive Functions vs Laws of Form
I will now argue that Turing’s and Ashby’s views on biology provide a key
to understanding their differences in approach on either of the aforementioned
levels. Both the preferred type of modelling and the kind of functionalism chosen
are deeply informed by their views of the relevance of Darwinian evolution.
The arguably most articulate and most influential computational model de-
vised by Turing concerned the biological processes of morphogenesis (see Turing,
1952), which built on Sir D’Arcy Thompson’s, at its time, influential work On
Growth and Form (1942). Turing sought to apply and test Thompson’s account
of the generation of organic patterns, from an animal’s growth to the grown an-
imal’s anatomy, from the dappledness or stripedness of furs to the arrangement
of florets of a sunflower and the phyllotaxis, that is, the ordering of leaves on
a plant’s twigs. Turing’s question, like Thompson’s, was how such intricate and
differentiated patterns develop from genetically homogenous cells. Was there a
general mechanism of pattern formation that could be formally described? The
formalism of linear and non-linear differential equations used by Turing was ex-
pressly impartial to the actual biochemical realisation of pattern formation. It
would only provide some clues as to what concrete reactants, termed “morpho-
gens” by Turing, one should look out for. Answering questions of de facto real-
isation would be a central task for the many biologists, chemists and others who
followed Turing’s lead. Still, his account of morphogenesis was as close to a direct
modelling relation to a natural target system as it would get in Turing’s entire
work – closer in embodied detail than his proto-connectionist endeavours, and
certainly much closer than his imitation game.
In his morphogenetic inquiries, Turing did not inquire into any adaptive
function, in Darwinian terms, of the patterns so produced. These patterns may or
may not serve an adaptive function. Computationally modelling their formative
processes does not contribute to explaining that form’s function. Whether the
florets of a sunflower are patterned on a Fibonacci series, as they, in fact, are,
or whether they are laid out in grid-like fashion, as they cannot possibly be
according to the mathematical laws of form, is unlikely to make a difference in
terms of selective advantage. In turn, however, natural selection may not offer
a path to a grid-like pattern in the first place, while allowing for, and perhaps
enabling, but arguably not determining the Fibonacci pattern.
This seeming indifference towards adaptive functions might be referred to
Asaro’s observation that the computational mode of modelling is distinctly in-
direct, and cannot establish the modelling relation by itself (2011). It would have
to incorporate a reasonably elaborated theory of the target system that assigns
a suitable calculus and suitable inputs in order to attain any degree of sophist-
The Action of the Brain 7
ication. A reasonably elaborated theory of this kind was amenable to Turing’s
computational method in D’Arcy Thompson’s laws of form but apparently not
in Darwinian variation and natural selection.
The reasonable methodological choices that entitled Turing to a limited in-
terest in the evolutionary origins of organic patterns have a far-reaching im-
plication in terms of alignment with competing research paradigms: D’Arcy
Thompson’s laws of form were articulated with an explicit scepticism towards the
relevance of adaptation by natural selection in biology, and claimed an autonomy
of formative processes in organisms from Darwinian mechanisms (Thompson,
1942). More precisely, D’Arcy Thompson argued that an organism’s develop-
ment is subject to constraints on form that have to be explained, and can be
sufficiently explained, by reference to mathematical and physical regularities.
Hence, pattern formation cannot be subsumed under a Darwinian account of
random variation and natural selection. Natural selection does act on biological
forms with respect to their environmental fitness but it cannot generate them,
nor is it the only or even the primary constraint on the realisation of possible
forms. Instead, D’Arcy Thompson referred to Goethe’s archetype theory in this
context, picking up on laws of symmetry and the expression of identical forms
in otherwise variant organisms, and sharing the observation that some biological
forms are more probable to develop than others, whereas still others are genu-
inely impossible. He puts these Goethean claims and observations on a strictly
mathematical and physical footing: organic forms and their transformations are
both enabled and constrained by physical laws that can be expressed in math-
ematical terms. Turing picked up on the form of these mathematical expressions
and developed them into a dynamic model of pattern formation.
Even if Turing did not actively endorse D’Arcy Thompon’s sceptical view of
Darwinism, he at least implicitly went along with it, and chose to work under
a paradigm that built on it. Notably, as Boden (2006, pp. 1264-1267) observes,
Turing’s theory of morphogenesis was enthusiastically received by the embryolo-
gists of his day, who were more likely to be attached to theories of archetypes
and ontogenetic recapitulation than to notions of Darwinian selection. Moreover,
Boden highlights that Turing’s mathematical theory of morphogenesis was ulti-
mately proven right by more recent and powerful computer simulation methods,
and that it informed those branches of Artificial Intelligence that have come to
be known as Artificial Life. However, a similar status can be argued to accrue
to principles of Darwinian evolution.
Unlike Turing, Ashby repeatedly referred to the Darwinian notions of adapt-
ation and natural selection (for example, Ashby, 1960, p. 29). In doing so, he
exclusively focused on the adaptive aspects of evolution – which is not a matter
of course, as we saw, and which was not at all the dominant view in biology at
the time of his writing. Still, Ashby believed that random variation of existing
traits of a reproducible (or, in Ashby’s models, modifiable) system and selection
by differential reproduction (or continued functioning versus dysfunction) of that
system under the influence of a given set of environmental conditions will not
only be the primary but the exclusive path for a system to attain an adaptive
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or, in Ashby’s terminology, equilibrial state. Given that Darwinian evolution is
by and large gradual, variation is limited, first, to minor alterations and, second,
to acting only on parts of an existing structure, thereby excluding large-scale
changes across most or all parts of the system. Third, variation would typically
not affect continuously functioning adaptive traits: “organisms are usually able
to add new adaptations without destroying the old” (Ashby, 1960, p. 142). With
these limiting conditions in place, no other mechanisms than random variation
and natural selection were deemed required to explain the goal-oriented structure
and behaviour of an organism or other organised system.
Remarkably, however, in his very emphasis on adaptation, Ashby restricted
his focus to the origins of adaptive behaviour by learning, not inquiring deeper
into “genic” adaptation, so that the organic basis for the production of such be-
haviour was largely left aside.4 In fact, Ashby referred to biological evolution and
what he called “Darwinian Machinery” only in the more philosophical and spec-
ulative of his writings, for example, Ashby (1952, pp. 50-52) and Ashby (1967),
and, of course, in many places in his Journal. The Darwinian basis appears to
be taken for granted in its own, genuinely biological, adaptive organisation by
Ashby – while both behavioural and genic adaptation were assumed to be subject
to the same general laws of variation and selection.
The first obstacle to an incorporation of the organic level of adaptation into
Ashby’s model lies in a perennial problem of evolutionary theory: apart from
some fast-breeding model populations, observed under laboratory conditions and
the partial evidence they provide, one cannot observe natural variation and selec-
tion in real-time. Hence, one is not enabled, first, to precisely and unequivocally
map organic traits onto environmental conditions so as to define them as ad-
aptations (rather than contingent effects) to precisely these (rather than other)
conditions. Second, even if such mapping can be accomplished, there will be no
evidence whatsoever on the history and the dynamics of the concrete process
of adaptation – that is to say, unless one has a very good grasp of population
genetics and ecology along with paleontological evidence. These problems were
compounded by an interpretation of Darwinian evolution under which “the spe-
cies is fundamentally aimless (it finds its goals as it goes along)” (Ashby, no
year, no. 5). In a discussion of the DAMS, a post-homeostat machine model, he
actually embraces the view that “variables in the brain should be driven actively
by the environment” (Ashby, 1928-1972, p. 3831, entry of May 19th, 1952). Con-
temporary biology has come to accept different, more differentiated views of the
organism-environment relation. Some but not all present-day views appreciate
D’Arcy-Thompson and Turing’s morphogenetic laws, while many if not most of
them ascribe a more active role to organisms with respect to their environments.
4 Constraints, Implications, and Potentials
From the preceding observations, one might infer that there is one remarkable
lacuna in both Turing’s and Ashby’s accounts of the action of the brain: des-
4 For Ashby’s discussion of “Darwinian Machinery”, see also Asaro (2008, pp. 166-168).
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pite their references to variant traditions on biology, they appear to pay little
systematic attention to the question of the origins of the biological mechanisms
responsible for that action. This seeming lacuna is not a mere omission, but,
first and foremost a constraint imposed by the state of the biological sciences of
their time. It may also serve as a diagnostic of Turing’s and Ashby’s modes of
systematic theorising and their implications, which in turn may offer a potential
resolution to their seeming opposition.
With respect to the constraints involved, leaving the mechanisms of biological
origins out of the picture may, in Turing’s reliance on D’Arcy Thompson’s view
of biological form as well as in Ashby’s focus on behavioural adaptation, partly
owe to the fact that, at the time of their writing in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
the authors were not in a position to rely on what would become known as the
“modern synthesis” in evolutionary biology. That synthesis, developed between
1936 and 1947, paradigmatically stated by Julian Huxley (1942) and later sum-
marised by Ernst Mayr (1991, especially Ch. 9),5 was just about to become the
dominant biological paradigm, and took several years more to become part of
common knowledge. The modern synthesis amounted to crossing the Darwinian
mechanisms of adaptation by random variation and natural selection – which
had become somewhat rarefied since Darwin’s time – with the statistical laws
of mathematical population genetics, so as to produce, for the first time, a com-
prehensive and strongly empirically grounded paradigm of Darwinian biology.
Thereby, a considerable degree of consensus was established in evolutionary bio-
logy which, in conjunction with the rise of molecular biology, sidelined D’Arcy
Thompson’s laws of form along with a variety of epigenetic and vitalist theories.
While Turing did not live to see the full establishment of the modern syn-
thesis, an appreciation of Ernst Mayr’s work can be found in Ashby’s later
writings (see Ashby, 1928-1972, p. 6637, entry of December 27th, 1966). Accord-
ingly, an argument for isomorphisms between machines and human cognitive
traits that can rely both on mechanisms of genetic replication and variation in
population and on the Darwinian concept of functional analogy between phylo-
genetically distinct traits was not available to Turing, given his preference for a
different, competing and at that time still competitive tradition in biology. To
Ashby, Darwinian functional analogy was a desirable and straightforward route
but, given the state of biology at his time, one he could not consider entirely
safe. The perspectives towards a synthesis between their respective approaches
might have much improved with an adoption of some of the key insights of the
modern synthesis, and of what followed afterwards.
With respect to the systematic implications, if the importance of the organic
level of adaptation is generally acknowledged as a precondition of behavioural
adaptation in principle, and if the importance of embodiment and environment
in adaptive processes is accepted, Ashby’s material approach to modelling the
action of the brain provides an outline for a biologically informed cognitive sci-
ence – even though neither his homeostat model nor the state of biological theory
available to him were sufficiently equipped to develop it adequately.
5 A lucid secondary source on the modern synthesis is Depew and Weber (1995, Pt. II).
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If however, as in Turing, adaptive functions are deemed of secondary theor-
etical importance, while trial-and-error learning and neuronal patterns became
topics of his computational models, the possible relevance vs. irrelevance of ad-
aptive functions, for matters of consistency, should be allocated to different levels
of his inquiry. The distinction between the formal nature of the computational
method and the materiality and embodiment of its target systems will be of
methodological importance when it comes to computationally modelling em-
bodied phenomena and their adaptive functions. After all, Turing was right in
claiming a degree of universality for his computational method and its applic-
ability in science that could not be attained by other approaches to modelling,
including Ashby’s. Nothing in his approach rules out the possibility of computa-
tionally modelling adaptive processes once a sufficiently elaborated theory is in
place. At the same instance, nothing in Turing’s arguments requires that the op-
erations of his theoretical machines directly correspond to, let alone are identical
with, the action of the brain or the development of organisms. If one prefers to ar-
gue that cognition and biological pattern formation are computational processes
sensu strictu, one will have to look somewhere else than Turing.
With these constraints and implications stated, it will be possible venture
beyond what Turing and Ashby could de facto accomplish: from opposite angles,
they charted routes towards solutions to present-day issues in biology and cog-
nitive science alike. In conjunction, mathematical principles of biological pattern
formation and the mechanisms of genetic replication, expression and control dis-
covered since will provide information on the bounds on genetic variation and
phenotypical variance. By the same token, they will help to identify mechan-
isms of transmission and use of both genetic and developmental information
in structuring organic patterns and organism-environment relations. Conversely,
the effects of the structures thus produced might be subject to natural selection
or analogous mechanisms of retention of reproducible properties. Hence, apart
from natural selection proper, organisms become able to use information actively
and directly, or they become able to modify their environments in such a way
as to adapt them to their needs.
It is not too surprising then that, on the one hand, some of the more recent
heterodox accounts of evolution, such as Goodwin (1994), expressly supplement
Darwinian mechanisms with D’Arcy Thompson and Turing’s morphogenetic laws
and similarly minded strands of complexity theory. It is perhaps more surprising
that even as like-minded an approach as developmental systems theory (Oyama,
Griffiths, & Gray, 2001) fails to do so. On the other hand, selection-based self-
organisation of Ashby’s variety encountered a renaissance in some subfields of
Artificial Intelligence (for example, Beer & Williams, 2015; Harvey, Husbands, &
Cliff, 1994), or has been integrated with Turing’s approach in inquiries into the
evolution of information processing, from molecules to human beings, under the
heading of “meta-morphogenesis” (Sloman, 2013, 2018). Hence, what fist may
seem like a tension between two diverging approaches may actually converge on
various levels of inquiry, and may always have been meant to do so by Ashby
and Turing themselves.
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